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Abstract— Survivability is important in designing reliable op­
tical networks and has been widely studied in the literature. 
Most practical studies of high-speed recovery algorithms assume 
a single-link failure model. As networks grow in size and com­
plexity, both the likelihood and the impact of failures increase. In 
order to guarantee that a failure in one part of a network does 
not affect the operation of the entire global network, we must 
understand the impact of multiple failures and provide efficient 
solutions to address them. In this paper, we study the impact 
of non-simultaneous, two-link failures on different protection 
schemes and provide an understanding of the different failure 
scenarios that arise when a multiple failure model is considered. 
We then discuss tradeoffs between different solutions that may 
be employed to address multiple failures, and present a simple 
dynamic protection reconfiguration technique, which can be used 
to address multiple failures.
We quantify the tradeoffs between different protection schemes 
in terms of capacity cost and survivability from two sequential 
link failures. In dynamic protection reconfiguration, protection 
routes are quickly recomputed and resources are reassigned in the 
event of a failure, optimizing robustness from additional failures. 
With the use of a simple reconfiguration technique, a network’s 
survivability is limited only by topological constraints, where only 
complete network disconnections result in broken connections. 
For five sample networks, the dynamic protection reconfiguration 
technique requires little additional capacity while significantly 
improving the survivability.
Keywords: optical fiber communication, WDM network, 
optical network, network survivability, network reliability, 
protection, restoration, multiple failures,
I .  In t r o d u c t i o n
Optical transports have allowed us to meet the increasing 
demands for bandwidth driven by the exponential growth of 
data traffic through the use of wavelength division multiplex­
ing (WDM) technology. With the extremely high volume of 
traffic being carried on WDM networks, failures such as fiber 
cuts can result in a loss of enormous amount of data (on 
the order of several terabits per second) and revenue [1]. It 
is imperative to maintain a high level of reliability in order 
to support the growing number of critical applications that 
utilize these networks. Survivability—the ability to recover 
from network failures—is therefore an important aspect of 
optical networking.
The material presented in this paper is based in part upon work 
supported by National Science Foundation grants ANI 01-21662 ITR and 
ACI 99-84492 CAREER. The content o f  the information does not necessarily 
reflect the position or the policy o f  that organization.
There are many survivability techniques that offer tradeoffs 
between recovery speed, protection capacity, and management 
overhead and complexity (a brief survey of existing algorithms 
is provided in Section II). Because varying network environ­
ments have different reliability needs, a good understanding 
of these tradeoffs is necessary in order to efficiently manage 
and operate a network. In addition, as both the size and 
complexity of networks continue to increase, and as large 
networks become interconnected, the ability to gracefully 
degrade in the event of a failure also becomes important. To 
this end, multiple failure survivability is critical. A network 
must be able to handle multiple failures so that a failure in one 
part o f a network does not affect the entire network’s ability 
to recover from subsequent failures. A few studies dealing 
with double-link failures have been presented in the literature, 
but this problem still receives relatively little attention. In this 
article, we first present an overview of the failure models and 
the existing failure management schemes. We introduce a clas­
sification scheme for multiple failure management techniques 
and provide an overview of the topic.
A few intuitive techniques to solve the problem of multiple 
failure survivability exist and offer tradeoffs in terms of 
recovery time (which in turn translates to data loss), cost 
overhead, and management complexity. For example, dynamic 
recovery techniques can best handle multiple failures, but usu­
ally take much longer to recover broken connections compared 
to preplanned recovery techniques. On the other hand, multiple 
failure protection planning may be used to protect a network 
from multiple failures using preplanned recovery. This method 
allows fast recovery, but may incur inefficiently high cost 
in terms of network resources. Also, some combination of 
the two approaches may be implemented, but the increase 
in protocol, management and hardware complexity renders 
the solution less attractive. Further discussion of this issue 
is presented in Section 4.
We present dynamic protection reconfiguration, which is 
used to perform fast reconfiguration of recovery routes and re­
allocate protection wavelengths after a failure (online) to allow 
maximum recoverability from multiple failures. Note that we 
focus on recovery techniques that guarantee less then 100ms 
recovery time and, therefore, consider protection rather than 
(dynamic) restoration [2], Dynamic protection reconfiguration, 
or DPR in short, is a more capacity-efficient alternative to 
multiple failure protection planning. A network dynamically 
adapts to failures under DPR, and can achieve the maximum
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robustness bounded by the topology.
We assume two-link connected mesh networks in this paper, 
but the technique is not limited by the connectivity of a 
network. Most WDM wide area networks found in prac­
tice and in the literature are two-link connected. We also 
introduce a multiple failure classification scheme for WDM 
mesh protection algorithms, which aids in better understanding 
multiple failure survivability. We also introduce two metrics 
that capture a network’s ability to handle multiple failures, 
which is used to evaluate different protection schemes and the 
effectiveness of the dynamic protection reconfiguration tech­
nique. Dynamic protection reconfiguration is evaluated using 
four common protection schemes—dedicated path protection, 
shared path protection, dedicated link protection, and shared 
path protection.
We find that two classes of failures that affect all protection 
algorithms—recovery paths used for the first failure are hit 
by the second failure, or connections affected by the sec­
ond failure cannot be recovered because recovery paths are 
broken by the first failure—contribute to a large number of 
unsuccessful multiple failure recovery. Additionally, capacity- 
efficient algorithms that allow sharing of protection resources 
can dramatically improve operation costs, but significantly 
amplify the impact of failures. Our results show that shared 
protection is about 46% more vulnerable to unrecoverable 
two-link failures compared to dedicated protection. Protection 
reconfiguration can significantly raise the recovery ratio, the 
average percentage of successfully recovered connections from 
two-link failures, allowing over 98.9% of the affected connec­
tions to be protected. Protection reconfiguration can be used 
in conjunction with most protection schemes to achieve the 
maximum robustness for a given topology leaving the network 
vulnerable only to complete partitioning. Finally, we propose 
the use of DPR with maximally disjoint paths (MDP). When 
the number of failures is greater than or equal to the degree 
of connectivity, it may not be possible to reallocate a backup 
route that is completely disjoint with the live route. Using 
MDP’s instead of leaving the connections vulnerable in such 
cases allow the network achieve maximum robustness under 
multiple failures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The 
next section provides a brief background on optical layer 
survivability. In Section 3, we introduce normalized vulner­
ability and recovery ratio—metrics used to evaluate a net­
work’s susceptibility to two-link failures. We then discuss our 
failure classification scheme for two-link failures. A detailed 
description of dynamic protection reconfiguration is provided 
in Section 4. In Section 5, we apply our metrics under the clas­
sification scheme to sample networks from the literature, and 
evaluate the impact of dynamic protection reconfiguration on 
four different protection schemes (dedicated/shared link/path 
protection). Finally, Section 6 presents our conclusions.
I I .  B a c k g r o u n d
A. Failure Models
The high data rates in modem and future networks—on 
the order of several Gb/s in an optical network—exacerbate
the severity of failures. Failure modes in optical networks 
consist of channel failures, link failures, and failures of optical 
crossconnects (OXCs). Channel failures are the most common, 
and are often caused by the failure of a card or cards at a 
port of an OXC. Link failures—fiber cuts caused by wayward 
backhoes, amplifier failures, etc.—are also common, and lead 
to failure of all channels on all fibers in the link. Node (OXC) 
failures are less common, but can cause failure of all channels 
that originate, pass through, or terminate at the node. We focus 
on link failures in this paper.
B. Survivability Schemes
Protection and Restoration are the two main approaches 
that address link failures in optical networks [2]. Restoration 
addresses failures by locating free wavelength channels for 
backup after a failure occurs. Protection preplans backup 
routes that are used in the event of a failure. Protection and 
restoration offer a tradeoff between the speed of recovery 
and efficiency in terms of the use of spare capacity [3], [4]. 
Restoration schemes are more efficient in terms of capacity 
requirements, and offer better multiple failure survivability 
because it dynamically finds backup paths after a failure. 
However, protection can be implemented in a capacity efficient 
manner [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] and offer much faster recovery 
with the absence of the excess signaling delay needed for 
dynamic route discovery [10], [11], [12]. Restoration based 
recovery takes about 2 seconds, whereas protection schemes 
can achieve complete recovery in the order of tens of millisec­
onds [1]. Given the fact that many transport infrastructures 
require rapid recovery, we focus on protection algorithms.
Protection schemes can be generally classified into four 
types: dedicated path protection (DPP), shared path protection 
(SPP), dedicated link protection (SLP), and shared link pro­
tection (SLP). These techniques assume two-link connectivity, 
and guarantee recovery under single failures. Path protection 
requires the knowledge of the whole path and selection of a 
backup path that is link-disjoint (link failure survivable) or 
node-disjoint (node failure survivable) from the primary path. 
In DPP, a dedicated backup path is setup for each connection, 
and to achieve recovery in the event of a failure, this alternate 
path is used. DPP offers fast recovery because no signaling 
between the source and the destination nodes is required, but 
is inefficient in terms of capacity requirements. In SPP, the 
end nodes of a lightpath signal the intermediate nodes to 
establish the backup route. Capacity reserved for backup can 
be shared among different connections that do not share any 
common failure modes, or can be used to carry low priority 
(unprotected) traffic, which is preempted in the event of a 
failure. The signaling and configuration of the intermediate 
OXCs render SPP slow compared to DPP [13].
In link protection, nodes that are adjacent to the failure ini­
tiate recovery using reserved protection capacity. SLP allows 
sharing of protection capacity among different connections, 
whereas resources are dedicated in DLP. SLP is thus more 
cost-efficient compared to DLP. However, SLP is slower com­
pared to DLP due to signaling and configuration of intermedi­
ate nodes required after a failure. With link protection, failure
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Primary Path Dedicated Backup Wavelength
Recovery Path Shared Backup Wavelength
Fig. 1. Illustration o f  different protection approaches.
recovery usually involves the use of more local resources 
compared to path protection (as protection routes are found 
for each link rather than for the entire lightpath). Recovery 
is usually faster than path protection because recovery is 
initiated more quickly and fewer OXCs need to be signaled 
and configured (shorter, more local recovery routes), but it is 
more inefficient in terms of protection capacity [6], [8], [14].
Figure 1 illustrates the four different protection schemes. 
All four examples show two routed connections from node a 
to node d. We denote the paths p i ([a-b-c-d]) and p i  ([a-p- 
h-d]). In DPP, p i and P2  share the same recovery route [a- 
e-f-d ], but separate wavelengths are reserved. In SPP, p i  and 
P2 share both the recovery route and a backup wavelength 
channel. DLP and SLP protects each individual link along 
the primary path using separate recovery routes. Link [a,6] 
is protected by path [a-e-b] (Similarly-[6,c]-[6-e-/-c], [c,d]- 
[c-f-d], [a,g]-[a-e-g], \g,h]-[g-e-f-K\, [h,d]-[h-f-d]). DLP 
allocates separate wavelength channels for the recovery routes, 
whereas SLP allows sharing of wavelengths.
These protection schemes capture the characteristics of most 
protection algorithms found in the literature. For example, 
DLP based on selecting shortest recovery paths possible for 
each link provides the fastest recovery among all protection 
algorithms, including mesh protection [2], [5], [9], streams 
protection [15], flooding-based mesh restoration [16], gener­
alized loopback [17], p-cycles [18], ring-based schemes such 
as cycle double covers [19], and other protection methods that 
attempt to offer advantages of both PP and LP [20], [21]. On 
the other hand, SPP is considered the most capacity-efficient 
protection algorithm [13].
I I I .  M u l t i p l e  F a i l u r e  S u r v i v a b i l i t y
All of the survivability techniques discussed in the previous 
section are designed to handle single link or single node 
failures. However, the ability to better handle multiple failures 
is an important aspect of operating high performance networks 
and has recently started to become a topic of interest [22], [23], 
[24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29].
Although this work focuses on protection, it is important to 
understand that restoration techniques are inherently capable 
of handling multiple failures as it dynamically establishes 
new routes for connections that are affected by failures. In 
terms of survivability, restoration techniques are optimal in 
that they are limited only by the network topology and the 
available capacity. The downside of restoration, as mentioned 
in the previous section, is the recovery speed. Because all 
affected connections must be rerouted dynamically, the online 
computation time and recovery protocol renders restoration 
less attractive for networks that require high availability. In 
contrast, network management may decide to precompute mul­
tiple recovery routes and reserve enough wavelength channels 
to allow multiple failure recovery. Such techniques, which 
we refer to as multiple failure protection planning can be 
expensive in terms of protection capacity, and therefore re­
quires careful planning. In [25], an optimization technique for 
offline double-link failure protection planning for dedicated 
and shared link protection was presented. An optimization 
technique to reduce capacity is presented, but in general 
multiple failure protection planning techniques are inefficient 
in terms of network resources usage.
Also, some combination of the two approaches may be 
implemented, but the increase in protocol, management and 
hardware complexity in implementing two different recovery 
protocols render the solution less attractive.
We next discuss multiple failure models and the different 
approaches to managing multiple failures.
A. Multiple Failure Models
Multiple failures can be separated into two categories, 
differentiated by the temporal relationship between failures. 
Simultaneous failures refer to cases where multiple compo­
nents fail at the same time (from a recovery algorithm’s point 
of view). In other words, two failures happen close enough 
in time to disrupt recovery. One example of simultaneous 
failures is shared risk link group (SRLG) failures, such as a 
cut through a conduit shared by several topologically diverse 
links. SRLG requires special attention, as most recovery 
techniques cannot guarantee recovery from such failures, and 
poses complicated management issues that are out of the 
scope of this article [30]. Sequential failures are failures 
of multiple components separated by enough time for the 
recovery algorithm to complete recovery of each failure, but 
before they can be physically repaired. Recovery times are 
on the order of milliseconds in the optical layer, whereas 
physical repair of failures may take several hours or even days, 
exposing networks to sequential failures. Given the relative 
time scales for recovery and physical repair, sequential failures 
are much more likely to occur compared to simultaneous 
failures (with the exception of SRLG failures). We focus on 
addressing sequential multiple failures, and for the rest of the 
paper we use the terms multiple failures to mean sequential 
failures.
In this paper, to study a network’s ability to support graceful 
degradation multiple failures, we consider two-link failures. 
A two-link failure consists of two independent link failures
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O—O
Disconnection Failure
; ♦ ............
Path Hit Failure: i fails first 
Broken Path Failure: j fails first
Blocked Shared Path Failure:
1. i fails
2. a -b  is used for backup
3. j fails
4. j cannot be recovered
Fig. 2. Illustration o f  different types o f  failures.
in a network graph. The second failure occurs long enough 
after the first to allow normal recovery to complete (on the 
order of milliseconds) but before any physical repair can be 
accomplished (possibly up to several hours or days). The two- 
link failure model effectively captures the characteristics of 
sequential failures, and aids in understanding the critical issues 
in multiple failure survivability 1.
B. Failure Classification
Recovery algorithms can fail for many reasons, ranging 
from physical disconnection of a network to resource unavail­
ability due to sharing of protection channels. In [22], a hier­
archical failure classification was presented for fiber-switched 
link protection schemes. In this section, we present an intuitive 
failure classification scheme for two-link failures to capture 
the characteristics of connection-based protection schemes. 
The classes are organized into two types—fundamental and 
algorithmic—and we use these types to structure the text. For 
each class, we provide an intuitive rationale for the problems 
that lead to such failures, and explain the relative importance 
of the failure classes for typical networks.
1) Fundamental failures: Fundamental failures consist of 
network disconnection failures and capacity failures that occur 
as a result of network structure rather than as a result of the 
properties of recovery algorithms. No protection algorithm can 
possibly recover from disconnection failures. In a two-link 
redundant mesh network, failure of two links can partition the 
network, disconnecting some nodes from others and rendering 
recovery impossible for any protection scheme. The primary 
source of disconnection failures is nodes of degree two, as 
any such node becomes disconnected when both links to the 
node fail. Examples of each type appear on the upper left in 
Figure 2.
In the National network six nodes of degree two as well as 
six two-link cuts that partition more than one node from the 
rest of the network lead to disconnection failures. As shown 
in Figure 3, examples of the former include nodes 11 and 23, 
while examples of latter occur in the long chain of nodes in
'The significance o f  the two-link failure model, as intended in the original 
contribution in [22], is that it can be used to understand the impact o f  failures 
that can not be captured using single failure models. Our intent in focusing 
the two-link failure model for this paper is to understand the effect o f  multiple 
failures on a network rather than to study a double link failures scenarios in 
specific. Thus, it is imperative to note that the ideas and findings in this paper 
are not limited to two-link failures, but can be applied to n-link sequential 
failures in general.
the lower left of the network. In total, the network has 24 pairs 
of links that cause disconnection failures.
Capacity failures also result from the fact that many mesh 
networks are two-link connected. In protection reconfiguration, 
which is discussed in detail in Section IV, a secondary 
backup path is computed and reserved after a network is 
recovered from a failure. Pre-planning for two-link failure, as 
in [25], also requires a secondary backup path to be computed. 
However, in two-link connected networks a third, disjoint 
path (secondary backup path) does not exist for many node 
pairs, leaving some connections vulnerable to second link 
failures. Like disconnection failures, nodes of degree two pose 
a problem and capacity failures may also be disconnection 
failures.
2) Algorithmic failures: There are three algorithmic
failures—path hit, broken path, and blocked shared path— 
that correspond to common aspects of protection algorithm 
design. All protection algorithms that are found in the lit­
erature are affected by the first two types of failures, and 
blocked shared path affects all algorithms that allow sharing of 
backup resources among different connections. It is important 
to note that some algorithmic failures may also be fundamental 
failures. In this section, we highlight the circumstances in 
which each class applies.
The first class of algorithmic failures arises from two-link 
failure scenarios where the second failure breaks the recovery 
path for the first. We term this class of failures path hit fail­
ures. Another class of algorithmic failures that all protection 
algorithms encounter results from the first failure breaking 
the recovery path of the second failure. These failures, which 
we term broken path failures, arise from the possibility that 
a failed link is a part of assigned backup paths for some 
lightpaths. It is purely an effect of pre-planning protection 
channels, which is inherent in all rapid recovery schemes 
found in the form of protection in the literature. Broken path 
failures and path hit failures occur as a result of the same 
phenomenon differentiated only by the time ordering of the 
two failures. Therefore, vulnerabilities resulting from broken 
path failures and path hit failures are expected to be exactly the 
same. If reconfiguration (or static reservation of a secondary 
backup path) is used, a connection may experience slight data 
loss due to jitter caused by switching of a failed live path to a 
reserved one. With broken path failures, the live data stream 
is not affected.
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Implementing protection algorithms in a capacity-efficient 
manner leads to the third class of algorithmic failures. This 
type of failure, which we term blocked shared path failures, 
occurs in cases where shared backup resources are used to 
recover the first link failure, which leaves some lightpaths 
without protection. This class of failure affects all algorithms 
that address capacity-efficiency through sharing of protection 
wavelengths among different connections. Therefore, there is 
an inherent tradeoff between the degree to which the protection 
is optimized for capacity and the network’s ability to minimize 
failure impact.
Other than multiple failrues
C. Multiple Failure Management
We classify multiple failure management techniques based 
on protection schemes into three categories—offline multiple 
failure protection planning, online multiple failure protection 
planning, and dynamic protection reconfiguration (online), of­
fline multiple failure protection planning techniques [25], [22], 
[24], [23], [31] pre-allocate backup wavelengths using precom­
puted recovery routes based on a static traffic demand. Online 
multiple failure protection planning performs optimization 
(recovery path computation and resource allocation) online at 
the time of provisioning. A network reoptimized each time 
a new connection request arrives or leaves the network, and 
therefore supports dynamic traffic demands. However, it can 
introduce a considerable amount of management complexity 
as a difficult optimization problem may need to be solved 
very frequently. To the best of our knowledge, online multiple 
failure protection planning has not been studied. Dynamic 
protection reconfiguration adapts dynamically to failures by 
computing and allocation resources for new recovery routes 
only for the connections that were affected by a failure, after 
the failure has been successfully recovered by a protection 
scheme.
D. 1+N Pre-allocation
Pre-allocation involves setting up 1+N diverse paths (where 
N is the number of failures that the network must handle) and 
assigning wavelengths for all connection when the network is 
initially provisioned. This scheme best supports static traffic, 
and thus allows for offline capacity optimization of routing and 
wavelength assignment (RWA). Integer Linear Programming 
(ILP) approaches are most commonly used to optimize for 
capacity, but often are slow for large networks. Full optimiza­
tion may not be possible for many practical networks as the 
complexity of optimization problems grows exponentially with 
the size of the network and the demand as well a change in 
N. The optimization process, however, does not pose a serious 
problem in terms of management overhead, as it is performed 
only once for the network. Heuristics, such as genetic algo­
rithms and simulated annealing, can be used, but designing 
efficient heuristics may also be difficult. Protection capacity 
requirement is high for pre-allocation. Existing techniques 
have focused on optimizing capacity for double link failures 
and require over 200% capacity for recovery.
E. Static Reconfiguration
In static reconfiguration, two diverse paths are computed 
and allocated for each connection, and some buffer wave­
lengths based on a computation of all possible second failure 
scenarios are reserved. Optimization for RWA is done offline 
using ILP or other heuristics similar to pre-allocation. In the 
event of a failure, after the affected connections are recovered, 
the network is reconfigured according to the precomputed 
second failure scenario using the buffer wavelengths. Man­
agement can then choose to reiterate the buffer computation 
and reservation process in order to support recovery from ad­
ditional failures. During this reoptimization process, either ILP 
or some heuristic can be used. Capacity cost is lower compared 
to pre-allocation, but still may be expensive depending on the 
efficiency of the optimization technique used. To the best of 
our knowledge, no static reconfiguration allocation algorithm 
has been evaluated, but may be useful in designing future 
networks.
F. Dynamic Reconfiguration
Since most protection schemes are designed to handle one 
failure at a time, they can be naturally extended to handle 
sequential failures using reconfiguration. In the event of a 
failure, reconfiguration identifies and protects connections that 
are affected by the failure and the connection that are left 
vulnerable to additional failures. Reconfiguration information 
is then dynamically computed. Because the network dynam­
ically adapts to a specific failure, dynamic reconfiguration 
can handle an arbitrary number of sequential failures (as 
long as the topology permits), and requires little additional 
capacity. Dynamic adaptation requires online allocation of 
new wavelengths, however, which may not be possible if not 
enough capacity is available in the network due to a high load.
The speed of the reconfiguration process is important, as 
the network is left vulnerable to additional failures during 
the computation. Therefore, fast heuristics are more attractive 
compared to full optimization techniques such as ILP due to 
its run-time. A study on dynamic reconfiguration showed that 
less than 10% additional capacity is required to support two 
link failures [26] with a fast heuristic. Dynamic provisioning 
of lightpaths and the use of fast heuristics for RWA result 
in sub-optimal capacity utilization. Reoptimization similar to 
the technique used in static reconfiguration can be used to 
periodically redesign protection for existing traffic. There is a 
tradeoff in terms of management overhead and capacity cost 
based on the frequency of this reoptimization process.
IV . D y n a m i c  P r o t e c t i o n  R e c o n f i g u r a t i o n
In this section, we describe our simple dynamic protection 
reconfiguration algorithm that can be used in conjunction with 
most existing protection schemes to provide optimal multiple 
failure protection. The goal is to maximize the network’s 
ability to handle multiple failures (and therefore minimize 
service disruptions) while taking into account capacity costs 
and management complexity.
A more capacity-efficient alternative to multiple failure pro­
tection planning (1+N Pre-allocation) is to dynamically adapt
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1+N Pre-allocation StaticReconfiguration
Dynamic
Reconfiguration
Protection Capability
Limited by topology 
& choice of N Limited by topology
Limited by topology 
& available capacity
Traffic Demand Static Static Dynamic
Routing and 
Wavelength Assignment Offline
Offline w/
online reoptimization Online
Algorithm Complexity High (ILP)
Moderate (heuristic) 
to High (ILP) Low (fast heuristic)
Capacity Cost High (1+N paths) Moderate (2 paths+A) Low (~2 paths)
Management Overhead Low Low to moderate Moderate
Fig. 4. Multiple Failure Management Schemes.
to failures. A small portion of our results were first published 
in [26] where we introduced the idea of reconfiguration and 
hinted at the different tradeoffs in using such technique.
Our work is different from a few related works published 
since the introduction of the multiple failure classification in 
[22]. First, [25], [23], [24], [28] solves two-link survivability 
in the context of link protection, but the dynamic protection 
reconfiguration technique is orthogonal to the choice of pro­
tection schemes. In this paper, we apply the technique to both 
link protection and path protection. Furthermore, our goal is 
not to provide a detailed optimization technique for a particular 
protection scheme, but rather study the impact of multiple 
failures and understand the tradeoffs involved in different 
classes of algorithms. Second, most assume that the network is 
three-edge connected. Three-edge connected topologies allow 
complete recovery under any two link failures because three 
edge-disjoint paths can be found for every node pair. Dynamic 
protection reconfiguration does not limit the number of failures 
up to which the network can survive. Survivability depends 
on the topology and the choice of the routing algorithm. For 
instance, a network can fully handle k sequential failures, if the 
network is at least k + 1-connected. In most cases, employing 
the dynamic protection reconfiguration technique allows a 
network to reach the upper bound in survivability (limited by 
the topology). Last, others consider a static traffic demand and 
perform offline optimization. We consider an online routing 
model where offline optimization is not applicable. Many 
emerging WDM mesh networks will require fast setup and 
teardown of lightpaths under dynamic traffic demands which 
may render offline techniques less attractive [14], [32], [33].
Based on the many common networks found in practice and 
in the literature, dynamic protection reconfiguration assumes 
two-edge connectivity, and therefore assumes that the network 
can be fully protected against any single failure.
Preplanned double link failure survivability (1+N Pre­
allocation, N=2) requires a primary and two disjoint backup 
paths. We term these paths disjoint path triples. Disjoint 
triples may not exist for some node pairs since we assume 
two-connected networks. Dynamic protection reconfiguration 
can be used with existing protection schemes with a small 
additional routing constraint to work around this problem. At 
the time of provisioning, disjoint primary/backup path pairs 
must be carefully selected to allow a possible third path,
which is disjoint from the original backup path, to be routed. 
This constraint does not significantly affect capacity utilization 
in protection schemes (evaluation details appear in Section 
V). Therefore, different path selection techniques and routing 
strategies can be used in conjunction with dynamic protection 
reconfiguration with minimal impact on the efficacy of the 
routing algorithm.
The failure classification scheme presented in the previous 
chapter provides useful insights towards better addressing 
multiple failures. One intuitive and effective way to achieve 
higher multiple failure survivability is to first target algo­
rithmic failures. Algorithmic failures can be prevented by 
reconfiguring the network (recomputing recovery paths and 
re-allocating protection resources for affected connections). 
Blocked shared path failures are the easiest to avoid as it 
simply requires allocation additional wavelengths based on 
the same recovery routes. Path hit and broken path failures 
are slightly more difficult because they require computation 
of new recovery routes.
The goal is to reconfigure the affected connections as 
quickly as possible while minimizing capacity usage. Opti­
mally, reconfiguration can complete close to recovery time. 
Given the multiple failure model described in Section II, it is 
important to have the network reconfigured in time to handle 
additional failures. Figure 5 shows an outline of the steps 
involved in dynamic protection reconfiguration. Re-computed 
paths are found by using the same path selection technique 
used for lightpath provisioning in the network. Reconfiguration 
starts immediately after a failure is detected. We assume that 
the centralized manager keeps track of all the connections 
and that the affected connections are easily identified once the 
failure is recovered and localized. Keeping a data structure that 
tracks all the primary paths and the recoveiy paths provisioned 
on each link is useful in quickly identifying connections that 
are affected by the failure. Once the failure is detected, table 
lookup can be performed using the data structure.
A. Reconfiguring for Optimal Vulnerability
In two-connected networks (n-connected), there may not 
exist a disjoint path pair after failure and recovery of a link 
(or n-1 links). Therefore, the path pairs must share some links. 
The links that must be utilized and shared in order to establish 
a connection between two nodes are termed critical links and
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-The goal is to perform quick reconfiguration o f  connections that are affected by a failure.
-N ote that recovery paths redirect traffic between two nodes S  and E.
For path protection, 5  and E  are the source and destination nodes for a connection.
For link protection, S  and E  are the end nodes o f  the failed link along the primary path.
1. After a failure, identify the three sets o f  connections rendered vulnerable by the failure.
These sets correspond to the three classes algorithmic failures.
Cph =  set o f connections with broken primary paths (already recovered)
Cbp =  set o f  connections with broken recovery paths 
CbSp =  set o f  connections for which the assigned 
protection wavelengths were used for recovery o f  traffic in Cph-
2. Release the wavelengths used by the original primary paths in Cph and the wavelengths 
that are not used by backup paths other than the original backup paths in Q p
3. For each affected wavelength-channel in Q,sp, assign a different wavelength 
or allocate a new one i f  no compatible/sharable wavelength-channels exist
4. For each connection in Cph
a. find a new path between S  and E  that is disjoint with the recovery path.
[alternatively, find a new path between S  and E  that is maximally disjoint with the recovery path.]
b. assign wavelengths for the newly found path (wavelengths can be shared).
5. For each connection in Q ,p
a. find a new recovery path.
[alternatively, find a maximally disjoint path.]
b. assign wavelengths for the newly found path [wavelengths can be shared].______________________
Fig. 5. Outline o f  the Dynamic Protection Reconfiguration Technique.
-—*»• Shortest Primary 
from 18 to 23
-Sa»- Backup Path
The connection from 
18 to 23 cannot be recovered 
under two-link failures if 
shortest primary path is used
After fl (failure of link [22,8]), 
there exists no reconfiguration 
that allows full recovery 
if  failure f2 follows.
Note that the two-link failure 
fl-*-f2 is not a disconnection.
Fig. 6. Example o f  non-critical link failure affecting two-link survivability 
due to poor choice o f  routes.
the goal is to reconfigure with minimum number of critical 
links.
Since many mesh networks contain nodes of degree two, 
completely disjoint path (CDP) triples may not exist between 
some node pairs (node pairs with one or both end nodes with 
degree two), which leads to capacity failures (reconfiguration 
failures). In the National network, there are 108 unordered 
node pairs for which disjoint triples cannot be found. For 
these connections, CDP reconfiguration will fail. However, 
capacity failures that are not also disconnection failures can 
be addressed by finding what we term maximally disjoint 
paths (MDP). Figure 7 illustrates MDP selection. Dynamic 
protection reconfiguration with MDP allows the network to 
support optimal multiple failure survivability. The algorithm 
for computing MDP is simple and is outlined in Figure 8.
It is also interesting to note that, depending on the network 
topology and the routing choices made, failures of non-critical 
links can also impair the network’s ability to recover from 
multiple failures. Figure 6 illustrates the effect of choosing the 
shortest path for the connection from node 18 to 23. Notice
S
O
Sp’
D
o
S
a
Sp’
-X*
Sb’
Dp’
.. D
. - - O
Db’
O  node w/ deg=2 #  node w/ deg>2
-----path w/ 0 or more nodes w/ deg=2
-----path w/ 0 or more nodes w/ deg>l
......path found by reconfiguration
Fig. 7. Maximally disjoint path selection. After a link failure and dynamic 
protection reconfiguration, only link(s) between S and Sp’ is(are) left vulner­
able to a second link failure.
-T he goal is to quickly find a path b that is maximally disjoint 
to the current live path p.
-U se  the same shortest path algorithm used in provisioning with 
updated link costs:
a. \E\, i f  the link is used by the working path
a. 0, i f  a link has a released wavelength-channel that is compatible
b. 1, otherwise________________________
Fig. 8. Simple algorithm for computing min cost - Maximally Disjoint Paths
that f l  occurs on a link that is not critical to the flow between 
nodes 18 and 23. If an alternate route is chosen for the primary 
and backup pairs (18-17-8-0-23 and 18-19-20-21-22-23), only 
critical link failures impair the network’s survivability (in the 
two-link failure scenario).
V . E v a l u a t i o n
This section provides the details and the results from our 
investigation of multiple failure survivability and dynamic pro­
tection reconfiguration. We study four protection schemes— 
DPP, SPP, DLP, and SLP—using five representative networks 
shown in figures 3 and 9. Before discussing the results, we
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Fig. 9. Sample Networks.
first provide the evaluation details. In this section only, we 
use DPR to refer to dynamic protection reconfiguration for 
brevity.
Since the results on different networks were similar, we 
present the results of the National network in this section, and, 
for clarity of presentation, we show the results of the other 
networks in the Appendix. The Arpanet network is different 
because it is three link connected.
A. Network and Traffic Model
To some extent, failure impact depends on the network 
traffic conditions. Therefore, study of different protection algo­
rithms requires a fair and consistent basis for comparison. We 
assume uniform traffic demands, which can effectively aid in 
capturing the different characteristics of protection algorithms.
We consider on-line provisioning with uniformly distributed 
full-mesh traffic demands, and we assume that the network is 
optically opaque and capable of full wavelength conversion. 
On-line provisioning means that we have no knowledge of 
future demands, and cannot reroute existing connections on 
the network to optimize provisioning upon receipt of a new 
request. Each request is assumed to be a bidirectional connec­
tion with a uniformly distributed demand of one connection 
between each source and destination. (Nx(N-l))/2 bidirec­
tional requests are routed in random order to simulate an on­
line provisioning process. Although, in practice, the demands 
may not be uniformly distributed among different requests, 
we believe that studying uniformly distributed traffic demands 
is sufficient in that it shows the characteristics of different 
protection schemes for the purpose of studying multiple failure 
survivability. We assume that each A-channel has a cost of 1 
in terms of calculating capacity. The total cost of capacity is 
therefore the sum of the overall of working paths and the total 
number of the reserved protection wavelengths. Although a 
uniformly distributed traffic demand is assumed for evaluation 
in this work, our metrics, the failure classification scheme, and 
DPR assume nothing about the traffic model.
B. Protection Routing
The details of our routing algorithms for the four protection 
schemes are described in this section. We evaluated the pro­
tection schemes without DPR, with DPR using CDP selection 
(DPR-CDP), and finally with DPR using MDP (DPR-MDP) 
selection. Our primary goal in path selection is to reduce 
the capacity cost, therefore protection capacity is used as the 
primary metric. When applicable, path length is also used to 
break a tie between choices that have the same capacity cost. 
Shorter paths are preferred over longer ones. Path hit failures 
and broken path failures are a function of the length of the 
recovery routes. Therefore, selecting shorter recovery routes 
may allow some connections to avoid path hit and broken 
path failures (without DPR). However, for shared protection 
schemes, allowing longer paths may reduce protection capacity 
because average sharing is increased. Therefore, there is a 
tradeoff between capacity and the multiple failure surviv­
ability. For our experiments, we first find the shortest paths 
available in the network. Then, we let the algorithm consider 
paths that are some number hops longer than the length of 
a shortest path. We report the results on using some extra 
number of hops that allowed the most reduction in capacity 
with least impact on multiple failure survivability. Because 
allowing extra hops in dedicated protection is meaningless, 
only shortest paths were used.
First, we route the full mesh demand. Then, to calculate 
the average normalized vulnerability and recovery ratios as 
well as DPR capacity cost, we simulate all possible two-link 
failure scenarios. DPR is used after a first link failure, and 
the average DPR capacity cost is the average of the additional 
cost incurred by DPR over all first link failures in the network. 
Vulnerabilities and recovery ratios can be calculated after 
simulating the second link failure.
1) Path Protection: For path protection, we select a link- 
disjoint path pair, between the source and destination nodes, 
that minimizes capacity cost. For DPP, we select a path pair 
that has the shortest path lengths. For SPP, since protection 
paths can be shared, we perform local optimization on sharing 
protection capacity. In other words, paths are chosen such that 
the network is optimized assuming no knowledge of future 
connection requests. With no information about future routing 
demands in the on-line routing model, local optimization is 
optimal. Wavelength assignment for a backup route, therefore, 
is determined by evaluating all possible available wavelengths 
to maximize sharing (minimize cost). With the on-line routing 
model, it is also assumed that no previously routed lightpaths 
can be disrupted to perform rerouting optimizations. The path 
selection process is similar to the joint selection algorithm 
presented in [5].
As discussed in Section IV, DPR places a small constraint 
on routing. Because we hope to restore lightpaths after two 
links are cut, we must choose the primary/backup path pair 
that allows another link-disjoint path. Again, this constraint 
virtually has no effect on routing. Only a single connection 
in the LATA ‘X’ network was affected (provisioned with a 
different choice of paths).
Connections with either degree two source or destination
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N=24 E=44 DPP SPP DLP SLP
# extra hops 0 3 0 4
primary/backup 2.899 2.971 2.899 2.899
path length 4.167 5.312 2.641 3.868
avg. link load 88.64 103.91 132.41 177.0
capacity cost 3900 2564 5826 2792
disconnection 0.013
no reconfiguration
vulnerability 0.650 1.0 0.089 0.697
recovery ratio 0.913 0.900 0.966 0.963
path hit 0.464 0.799 0.078 0.289
broken path 0.464 0.799 0.078 0.289
blocked 
shared path - 1.0 - 0.697
dynamic protection reconftguration-CDP
vulnerability 0.507 0.781 0.022 0.061
recovery ratio 0.947 0.940 0.993 0.993
capacity 0.259 0.304 0.018 0.043
reconfiguration
cost
38.64
1%
142.36
5.6%
50.27
0.9%
77.86
2.8%
dynamic protection reconfiguration-MDP
vulnerability 0.013
recovery ratio 0.993 0.994 0.995 0.996
reconfiguration
cost
80.18
2%
175.96
6.9%
123.82
2.1%
135.82
4.9%
TABLE I
N o r m a l iz e d  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  N a t io n a l  n e t w o r k . 
V u l n e r a b i l i t y  m e a s u r e s  a r e  in  i t a l ic s .
nodes, or both, do not have three CDPs. For DPR-CDP, these 
connections result in capacity failures. For DPR-MDP, we use 
the MDP selection technique presented in the previous section.
2) Link Protection: DLP and SLP were also set up in a 
manner akin to DPP and SPP. For DLP, shortest paths for both 
primary and all backup paths were chosen to achieve efficiency 
in both recovery speed and capacity cost. For SLP, backup 
paths for individual links in the primary paths were found in 
a manner akin to SPP. Results show that our implementation 
is consistent with results found in the literature [8], [34], [35], 
with SPP providing 20%~50% savings in capacity over SLP 
while using, on average over the five sample networks, less 
than 50% of the capacity used for primary channels.
CDP triple selection is different from path protection in that, 
with link protection, protection routes protect each individual 
link in a lightpath. Therefore, CDPs or MDPs, are found for 
each link using instead of source and destination node pairs.
C. Results
First, Table I and Tables IV~VI (presented in the Appendix) 
show the average primary and protection path lengths, capacity 
cost for each protection scheme without DPR, as well as the 
average link load. Average backup path lengths are presented 
in terms of hop counts. Average link load is the average 
number of both primary and protection paths provisioned on a 
link. This measure shows how many connections are affected, 
on average, by link failures. We also show the vulnerability 
measure applied to the failure classification scheme and the 
recovery ratios for each protection scheme (without DPR, with 
DPR-CDP, and with DPR-MDP). Average DPR cost is also 
reported. We use the National network to discuss the results.
National ARPANET N.J. LATA COST 239 LATA ‘X ’
SPP 1.27 1.07 1.17 1.40 1.11
SLP 1.46 1.41 1.14 1.31 1.93
TABLE Ii
Av e r a g e  b a c k u p  p a t h  l e n g t h  o v e r h e a d  in  t e r m s  o f  n u m b e r  o f
HOPS FOR SHARED PROTECTION ALGORITHMS OVER DEDICATED 
PROTECTION.
Fundamental failures make up a small portion of network 
vulnerabilities at 0.013 for the National network, which is most 
heavily affected by physical dissections among the five sample 
networks.
The results indicate that most unrecoverable second link 
failures are caused by path hit failures and broken path failures. 
Vulnerability measures resulting from path hit failures and 
broken path failures have the exact same value confirming our 
intuition that these failures are only different in the ordering 
of the failure of the two links. These failures are directly 
affected by the lengths (in terms of number of hops) of the 
recovery paths as more link failures affect protection paths of 
longer length, leaving a network more susceptible to additional 
failures. Similarly, average link load shows the number of 
primary and protection paths that are affected when a link 
fails. More paths are affected by a failure in a network with a 
higher average link load, and the lengths of protection paths 
have a direct impact on this measure. Therefore, path hit 
failures and broken path failures are some function of the 
lengths of the protection paths. Many two link failures can 
also cause both path hit and broken path failures. There is 
an interesting difference in algorithmic properties between 
PP and LP highlighted by the difference in vulnerabilities 
from algorithmic failures. DPP and SLP for the National (and 
also N.J. LATA) network, despite similar average backup path 
lengths, have different path hit/broken path vulnerabilities. 
The impact of a two-link failure is smaller for LP because 
it depends on the operation of links that are more local to 
the point of failure whereas in PP, recovery may depend on 
backup paths that require the use of links across the entire 
network.
Intuitively, optimizing protection capacity cost can signif­
icantly degrade multiple failure survivability for a network. 
The effect of sharing optimization is two fold. First, in shared 
protection schemes, protection paths are elongated by a factor 
1.2 on average over the five networks for PP and an average 
of 1.45 for LP. Penalties incurred by SPP and SLP for each 
network is shown in table II. In efforts to achieve more 
efficient use of wavelength channels in the network, longer 
backup paths may be provisioned to allow more efficient 
sharing between different connections. As discussed above, 
longer recovery paths expose the network to more path hit 
failures and broken path failures. Allowing longer protection 
paths has a huge effect on multiple failure survivability. 
Second, blocked shared path failures make the network more 
susceptible to additional failures. SPP suffers significantly 
more from blocked shared path failures compared to SLP. One 
very interesting result is that for SPP, the network is vulnerable 
to every second link failure (network vulnerability of 1.0)
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without DPR. Blocked shared paths dominate the network’s 
susceptibility to second failures. For SPP, blocked shared path 
failure vulnerability is 1.0, which shows that at least one 
protection wavelength is shared between connections that are 
affected by a two-link failure. In contrast, SLP does not suffer 
as much from blocked shared path failures. The difference, 
again, is due to the fact that in link protection, recovery 
routes are closer to the point of failures. LPs have larger link 
loads compared to PPs, but a much smaller fraction of the 
connections that are affected by the first failure are affected 
by the second failure. Generally, LP handles multiple failures 
better than PP due to the fact that recovery is dependent on a 
smaller section of the network that is more local with respect 
to the failed links.
DPR maximizes multiple failure survivability of a network 
with little additional capacity. For the National network, 
DPR-CDP requires no more than 5.6% additional capacity 
with the full mesh demand routed, and DPR-MDP requires 
up to 6.9%. With DPR, a protection scheme can optimize 
for capacity without affecting multiple failure survivability. 
With DPR-CDP, an average recovery ratio of over 99% can 
be achieved regardless of the choice of protection schemes. 
The optimal vulnerability of 0.013 for the National network, 
can be achieved with DPR-MDP. DPR significantly reduces 
vulnerability for all protection schemes, which allows network 
management to consider other tradeoffs between protection 
schemes, such as recovery speed, cost and management over­
head, without worrying about multiple failure survivability.
1) Discussion: A significant advantage of DPR over mul­
tiple failure protection planning techniques is that DPR is 
not limited to handling a fixed number of link failures (for 
example, two-link failures) and can cover arbitrary number 
of failures without reserving excess protection wavelengths. 
It is important to note that with a failure scenario involving 
three or more links, the impact of disconnection failures 
starts to dominate and it becomes increasingly difficult to 
recover lightpaths. The two-link failure model is veiy useful 
in the sense that it captures the necessary details and the 
characteristics of multiple failure protection techniques and 
different protection schemes under multiple failures.
It is interesting to note that investigating node failures in 
our evaluation of multiple failure survivability provides little 
additional insight. The key difference between link and node 
failures is that more lightpaths are affected by a failure of a 
node because a node failure is equivalent to a failure involving 
failures of all the links adjacent to the node. Therefore, 
node failures incur higher capacity cost, but the recovery 
ratio remains more or less the same (average of the recovery 
ratio of the adjacent links). Protection capacity may also be 
slightly affected by node failures because fewer node-disjoint 
paths exist compared to link-disjoint paths in mesh networks. 
Quantifying the effect of the choice over different number of 
paths in shared protection schemes is out of the scope of this 
work.
V I .  C o n c l u s i o n
In order to further guarantee high quality of services for 
the increasing communications demands, we must be able to
maximize network utilization even in the event of failures. 
Graceful degradation of services must be considered in de­
signing more robust and dependable future networks. Multiple 
failure survivability is a direct measure of a network’s ability 
to operate effectively under failures.
Pre-planning multiple recovery routes and reserving enough 
wavelengths to allow a network to recover from multiple 
failures can be expensive in terms of protection capacity. 
In contrast, dynamic protection reconfiguration can allow a 
network to achieve high survivability under multiple failures 
while utilizing little additional capacity.
Our results showed that a large number of two-link failures 
that result in complete outages for some connections were 
caused by path hit and broken path failures (a two-link failure 
affects both the primary and backup routes for some connec­
tions). Shared protection schemes are much more capacity- 
efficient compared to dedicated protection schemes—by over 
30% for path protection and over 45% for link protection—but 
suffer significantly in terms of multiple failure survivability. 
Shared path protection is vulnerable to roughly 35% more 
links compared to dedicated path protection, and shared link 
protection is vulnerable to about 57% more links compared 
to dedicated link protection. This difference is due to blocked 
shared failures and increased protection path lengths in shared 
protection schemes. Shared protection schemes are much more 
capacity-efficient however.
On five representative networks, dynamic protection recon­
figuration required less than 4.4% additional capacity for dedi­
cated path protection, less than 10% for shared path protection, 
less than 4.3% for dedicated path protection, and less than 
7.5% for dedicated path protection. Compared to networks 
configured without dynamic protection reconfiguration, we 
found that the network vulnerability was reduced by over 
90%. Dynamic protection reconfiguration allows networks to 
operate with the maximum multiple failure survivability for 
a given network topology where only disconnections (topo­
logical separation) can leave a lightpath unrecoverable. The 
average number of successfully recovered channels under two- 
link failures was over 99%.
The choice of protection schemes offer tradeoffs in terms 
of recovery speed, capacity and equipment cost, management 
overhead, and multiple failure survivability. Dynamic protec­
tion reconfiguration allows different protection schemes to 
achieve about the same level of multiple failure protection 
with little additional capacity. With DPR, tradeoffs between 
protection schemes, such as recovery speed, cost and manage­
ment overhead, can be considered without affecting multiple 
failure survivability.
A p p e n d i x
Tables IV~VI show the evaluation results. The Arpanet 
network is three-link connected. Therefore, we can get 100% 
recovery ratio (it is not affected by fundamental failures). 
Maximally disjoint path formulation is not used with the 
Arpanet network because completely disjoint path triples can 
always be found between all node pairs.
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N=20 E=32 DPP SPP DLP SLP
# extra hops 0 1 0 4
primary/backup 2.763 2.805 2.753 2.753
path length 4.121 4.411 3.505 4.945
avg. link load 81.75 85.69 147.25 194.31
capacity cost 2616 1658 4712 1948
disconnection 0.0
no recorfiguration
vulnerability 0.812 1.00 0.202 0.812
recovery ratio 88.9% 88.5% 94.6% 04.9%
path hit 0.696 0.783 0.135 0.393
broken path 0.696 0.783 0.135 0.393
blocked 
shared path - 0.998 -
0.8
dynamic protection reconfiguration-CDP
vulnerability 0.0
recovery ratio 100%
capacity 0.0
reconfiguration
cost
115.06
4.4%
174.88
10.5%
201.88
4.3%
147
7.5%
TABLE III
E v a l u a t io n  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  A r p a n e t  n e t w o r k . V u l n e r a b il it y
MEASURES ARE IN ITALICS. CDPS CAN BE FOUND FOR ALL NODE PAIRS
b e c a u s e  A r p a n e t  is  t h r e e - l i n k  c o n n e c t e d .
N=19 E=37 DPP SPP DLP SLP
# extra hops 0 3 0 2
primary/backup 2.24 2.304 2.24 2.24
path length 3.164 4.345 2.196 2.885
avg. link load 49.95 61.46 66.16 80.43
capacity cost 1848 1200 2448 1340
disconnection 0.011
no reconfiguration
vulnerability 0.592 0.998 0.096 0.670
recovery ratio 92.3% 90.8% 96% 95.7%
path hit 0.42 0.626 0.083 0.218
broken path 0.42 0.626 0.083 0.218
blocked 
shared path - 0.998 - 0.662
dynamic protection reconfiguration-CDP
vulnerability 0.464 0.7 0.023 0.056
recovery ratio 94.8% 94% 99.2% 99.1%
capacity 0.293 0.35 0.019 0.042
reconfiguration
cost
16.32
0.9%
62.05
5.2%
27.14
1.1%
34.32
2.6%
dynamic protection reconfiguration-MDP
vulnerability 0.011
recovery ratio 99.1% 99.4% 99.5% 99.5%
reconfiguration
cost
24.49
1.3%
76
6.3%
56.11
2.3%
45.19
3.4%
TABLE V
E v a l u a t io n  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  C o s t  239  n e t w o r k . V u l n e r a b i l i t y
VALUES ARE IN ITALICS.
N = 11 E=23 DPP SPP DLP SLP
# extra hops 0 1 0 1
primary/backup 1.745 1.745 1.745 1.745
path length 2.309 2.691 2.0 2.281
avg. link load 19.39 21.22 25.04 27.39
capacity cost 446 316 576 326
disconnection 0.012
no reconfiguration
vulnerability 0.431 0.905 0.194 0.727
recovery ratio 90.6% 89.6% 93.7% 93.5%
path hit 0.273 0.372 0.15 0.251
broken path 0.273 0.372 0.15 0.251
blocked 
shared path -
0.846 - 0. 692
dynamic protection reconfiguration-CDP
vulnerability 0.328 0.427 0.03 0.077
recovery ratio 94.1% 93.4% 98.7% 98.4%
capacity 0.206 0.245 0.024 0.055
reconfiguration
cost
5.04
1.1%
13.57
4.3%
3.04
0.5%
9.13
2.8%
dynamic protection reconfiguration-MDP
vulnerability 0.012
recovery ratio 98.9% 99% 99.2% 99.3%
reconfiguration
cost
5.04
1.1%
13.57
4.3%
13.91
2.4%
10.17
3.1%
N=28 E=47 DPP SPP DLP SLP
# extra hops 0 2 0 6
primary/backup 3.286 3.505 3.286 3.286
path length 4.669 5.188 2.861 4.415
avg. link load 127.96 139.83 204.04 286.17
capacity cost 6014 4040 9590 4434
disconnection 0.006
no reconfiguration
vulnerability 0.747 1.0 0.09 0.605
recovery ratio 90.8% 89.9% 96.7% 96.5%
path hit 0.586 0.8 0.072 0.265
broken path 0.586 0.8 0.072 0.265
blocked 
shared path - 1.0 - 0.605
dynamic protection reconfiguration-CDP
vulnerability 0.644 0.789 0.026 0.090
recovery ratio 95.3% 95.1% 99.3% 99.3%
capacity 0.297 0.329 0.019 0.062
reconfiguration
cost
109.7
1.8%
266.89
6.6%
180
1.9%
169.53
3.8%
dynamic protection reconfiguration-MDP
vulnerability 0.006
recovery ratio 99.7% 99.8% 99.7% 99.8%
reconfiguration
cost
144.51
2.4%
285.96
7.1%
249.75
2.6%
254.17
5.7%
TABLE IV
E v a l u a t io n  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  N.J. LATA n e t w o r k . V u l n e r a b il it y
MEASURES ARE IN ITALICS.
TABLE VI
E v a l u a t io n  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  L A T A  ‘X ’ n e t w o r k . V u l n e r a b i l i t y
MEASURES ARE IN ITALICS.
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